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99 lines
No EOL
4.4 KiB
Text
Executable file
99 lines
No EOL
4.4 KiB
Text
Executable file
server:
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# https://manpages.debian.org/bullseye/unbound/unbound.conf.5.en.html
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#
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# If no logfile is specified, syslog is used
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logfile: "/var/log/unbound/unbound.log"
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verbosity: 0
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interface: 127.0.0.1
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port: 5335
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do-ip4: yes
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do-udp: yes
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do-tcp: yes
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# Maybe set to no if you don't have IPv6 connectivity
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do-ip6: yes
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# You want to leave this to no unless you have *native* IPv6. With 6to4 and
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# Terredo tunnels your web browser should favor IPv4 for the same reasons
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prefer-ip6: no
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# if given, user privileges are dropped (after binding port),
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# and the given username is assumed. Default is user "unbound".
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# If you give "" no privileges are dropped.
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username: "unbound"
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# Use this only when you downloaded the list of primary root servers!
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# If you use the default dns-root-data package, unbound will find it automatically
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root-hints: "/etc/unbound/root.hints"
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# File with trusted keys for validation. Specify more than one file
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# with several entries, one file per entry.
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# Zone file format, with DS and DNSKEY entries.
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# Note this gets out of date, use auto-trust-anchor-file please.
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trust-anchor-file: "/usr/share/dnssec-root/trusted-key.key"
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# Trust glue only if it is within the server's authority
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harden-glue: yes
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# Require DNSSEC data for trust-anchored zones, if such data is absent, the zone becomes BOGUS
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harden-dnssec-stripped: yes
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# Don't use Capitalization randomization as it known to cause DNSSEC issues sometimes
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# see https://discourse.pi-hole.net/t/unbound-stubby-or-dnscrypt-proxy/9378 for further details
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use-caps-for-id: no
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# Reduce EDNS reassembly buffer size.
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# IP fragmentation is unreliable on the Internet today, and can cause
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# transmission failures when large DNS messages are sent via UDP. Even
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# when fragmentation does work, it may not be secure; it is theoretically
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# possible to spoof parts of a fragmented DNS message, without easy
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# detection at the receiving end. Recently, there was an excellent study
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# >>> Defragmenting DNS - Determining the optimal maximum UDP response size for DNS <<<
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# by Axel Koolhaas, and Tjeerd Slokker (https://indico.dns-oarc.net/event/36/contributions/776/)
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# in collaboration with NLnet Labs explored DNS using real world data from the
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# the RIPE Atlas probes and the researchers suggested different values for
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# IPv4 and IPv6 and in different scenarios. They advise that servers should
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# be configured to limit DNS messages sent over UDP to a size that will not
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# trigger fragmentation on typical network links. DNS servers can switch
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# from UDP to TCP when a DNS response is too big to fit in this limited
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# buffer size. This value has also been suggested in DNS Flag Day 2020.
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edns-buffer-size: 1232
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# Perform prefetching of close to expired message cache entries
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# This only applies to domains that have been frequently queried
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prefetch: yes
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# Fetch the DNSKEYs earlier in the validation process, when a DS record is encountered.
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# This lowers the latency of requests. It does use a little more CPU.
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prefetch-key: yes
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# One thread should be sufficient, can be increased on beefy machines.
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# In reality for most users running on small networks or on a single machine,
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# it should be unnecessary to seek performance enhancement by increasing num-threads above 1.
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num-threads: 1
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# Ensure kernel buffer is large enough to not lose messages in traffic spikes
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so-rcvbuf: 1m
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# increase cache size to utilize more RAM | msg * 2 = rrset
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msg-cache-size: 128m
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rrset-cache-size: 256m
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# Aggressive NSEC uses the DNSSEC NSEC chain to synthesize NXDOMAIN
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# and other denials, using information from previous NXDOMAINs answers.
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# It helps to reduce the query rate towards targets that get a very high nonexistent name lookup rate.
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aggressive-nsec: yes
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# If enabled id.server and hostname.bind queries are refused.
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hide-identity: yes
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#If enabled version.server and version.bind queries are refused.
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hide-version: yes
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# Ensure privacy of local IP ranges
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private-address: 192.168.0.0/16
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private-address: 169.254.0.0/16
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private-address: 172.16.0.0/12
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private-address: 10.0.0.0/8
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private-address: fd00::/8
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private-address: fe80::/10 |